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Just before midnight in December of 1945, Private First Class Leon Standifer, a member
of the 243rd Field Artillery Battalion on occupation duty in Germany, was hurrying to catch the
late-night bus from Munich back to his barracks in nearby Bad Aibling, after visiting with a
female “companion” for most of the day. To save time, he cut through a section of town largely
destroyed by Allied air-raids, and recalls the following:
Those bombed-out areas were dangerous. There were no lights, and rumor said ex-SS
lived back in there. They called themselves Werwölfe-werewolves-and used women to
lure GIs into dark places…pretty soon I saw two men standing on the sidewalk. I was
already walking in the middle of the street but worked myself over toward the far side.
Then a man stepped out of the shadows and said, ‘Eh Ami.’ I thought, ‘Now I’ve done it.
These men are the Werwölfe. This is what everybody tried to warn me about.’1
Luckily for Standifer, nothing came of the encounter. The men asked for cigarettes, and then
continued on down the street. His commentary on the Werwölfe, however, is a good
representation of the extent to which most American servicemen in Germany came in contact
with the SS-devised guerrilla movement; for most, the Werwolf was little more than a myth, or a
cautionary fairy tale. Those American troops who never came in contact with the organization
postwar knew very little beyond rumors and stories. The minor incident described above
represents the only contact Standifer, in his two years of occupation duty, had with the so-called
“Werewolves”.2
Werwolf, in its original sense, was an SS-led and organized commando unit formed by
Reichsführer-SS and Chief of German Police Heinrich Himmler in September of 1944, to be
used for partisan-style operations in areas of the Reich occupied by Allied forces.3 The aim was
to harass the Allies behind their lines, to the point where they would be forced to divert troops
and material away from the front in order to counter the threat, not unlike the resistance
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movements of occupied Europe that the Germans were all too familiar with. This constant
nagging, coupled with a stalwart defense of what remained of the Third Reich by the German
military, would buy Germany enough time to achieve an “acceptable” peace settlement. What
exactly such a settlement would have entailed is debatable, but Hitler above all else sought to
avoid an unconditional surrender and the harsh occupation of Germany. An additional hope was
that a prolonged war would allow more time for what Nazis viewed as the “inevitable” breakup
between the Western powers and the Soviet Union.4
Such a reversal of fortunes obviously never occurred; Werwolf never reached the grand
scale envisioned by Himmler, and very few Werwolf operations were actually carried out before
the rapid Allied advance into Germany brought the war to an end in May 1945.5
Thesis
The dissolution and failure of the Nazi Werwolf movement was influenced by both
German and American actions. The inability of the organization to fully mobilize and establish
itself before war’s end was due to extreme issues in the recruiting, training, supplying, and
commanding of Werwolf cells. These issues were the product of animosity and differences of
opinion between top Nazi leaders regarding control of Werwolf and allocation of resources for
the organization. The Werwolf also suffered from the bureaucratization so typical of the Nazi
regime; the appointing of “Werwolf Officers” from the Gestapo, Wehrmacht, Gauleitung, SS,
and other organizations, and the fact that the group itself fell under police and not SS control,
meant each individual associated with it brought a multitude of differing attitudes and priorities
to the table, resulting in constant squabbling that stalled much of the progress that could have
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been made in preparing the organization prior to the May 8th surrender.6 Following the end of the
war in Europe, what Werwolf cells did survive into the postwar era-and there were many that did,
as scattered and uncoordinated they might have been- were quickly eliminated due to a swift and
aggressive American occupation, coupled with an equally determined counterinsurgency
campaign undertaken by US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) units and occupation troops that
began in May of 1945 and lasted well into 1946. These two major factors-one German, one
American, sealed the fate of the Werwolf movement in the American Zone of Occupation and
ensured it would never amount to anything more than scattered incidents of sabotage during the
first two years of occupation that, while noteworthy, did not represent a general trend of guerrilla
resistance in the American Zone.

Historiography
Charles Whiting’s Hitler's Werewolves: The Story of the Nazi Resistance Movement,
1944-1945, published in 1972, represents perhaps the first attempt at a published history of the
Werwolf movement. The majority of the book, however, is a sensationalized narrative of an
assassination carried out by the group, and it is only in the last few chapters that Whiting
presents the “big picture” of Werwolf: its formation, leadership, and eventual downfall. Even
then, his writing does not address the postwar history of the organization, and leads us to believe
that the movement simply ended with the German surrender. Indeed, he seems to use the end of
the war as a convenient explanation as to why Werwolf fell apart, saying next to nothing about
the more relevant logistical, bureaucratic, and organizational issues that plagued it during the
final months of the war. While the book provides an excellent account of the Oppenhoff
assassination, it is at best a partial history of the movement as a whole. In addition, it is hard to
6
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determine how many of Whiting’s factual errors can be attributed to lack of sources and existing
scholarship on the subject and how much to simple lack of research.
The next extensive piece on Werwolf was not published until 1995. Klaus-Dietmar
Henke, a German historian, dedicates a portion of Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands to
a discussion of the organization. His is a much more thoroughly researched piece than the
Whiting account, and draws from both American and German sources. He is the first to point to
the indifference many German soldiers afforded Werwolf, as well as the dependence of the
movement on the SS and other military units for training sites and equipment. This latter point
hints at logistical and bureaucratic difficulties, but it is not fully developed. Henke also provides
a lengthy account of the CIC raids and other activities which combated postwar Werwolf activity.
Overall, the piece avoids the trap of simply stating that the Werwolf ended with the German
surrender, and marks the first attempt made by any author, German or otherwise, to provide a
complete, well-researched look at the Werwolf organization.
By far the most complete history of the Werwolf movement has been prepared by
historian Alexander Perry Biddiscombe, in his book Werwolf!: The History of the National
Socialist Guerrilla Movement, 1944-1946. Attempting to address the entire complicated history
of the organization, Biddiscombe uses each chapter in his book to discuss the Werwolf’s
relationship with each of the groups it was associated with: the SS, the Hitler Youth, the military,
and the Nazi party. In his introduction and conclusion he asserts that, contrary to popular belief,
there was a series of guerrilla-style attacks against Allied forces from 1944-45, and that the
Werwolf had a “profound impact…upon both Western Allied and Soviet occupation policy”.7 He
maintains that Werwolf, though obviously not a deterrent to occupation, continued postwar to
harass occupation troops, and provides a detailed account of the US counterinsurgency
7
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campaigns of 1945-46. Several important CIC-led operations are afforded little attention in
Biddiscombe’s writing, however, most notably “Tallyho”, the first major security sweep of the
American Zone following the war’s end.
Stephen G. Fritz’s Endkampf: Soldiers, Civilians, And The Death Of The Third Reich,
while not dealing directly with the subject of Werwolf resistance, addresses the topic nonetheless.
His section on the Werwolf focuses on guerrilla activity in the Franconian region of Germany,
the cradle of Nazism and thus an area conducive to Werwolf activity, and he notes that even here,
in what was once the heart of Nazism, Werwolf postwar failed to materialize on the scale
originally intended; though there were some minor acts of sabotage and violence, these were at
the “level of petty harassment”-though he does not go into why.8 While his writing is also well
researched, his discussion on Werwolf is region-specific, and his description of postwar CIC
operations focuses more on black marketeering and disturbances by Displaced Persons than
subversive activities.
Were someone hard-pressed to select a piece offering the “final word” on Werwolf, most
would no doubt choose Biddiscombe’s book. His work, though exhaustively researched and
extensive, however, is too indecisive to be considered definitive. He seems to offer contradictory
statements with regards to the book’s overall message, at one point stating its purpose is to
“gauge the limits of the movement’s success” and later explaining that “the goal is not an
aggressive revisionism, but rather a neutral stocktaking of forgotten people and events.”9 Though
Biddiscombe comes closest, no one has offered a complete look at all factors leading to
Werwolf’s demise. This paper deals exclusively with the subject of the Werwolf’s failure and,
unlike Biddiscombe’s work, does not support the idea that the organization was in any way
8
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successful. Given its original purpose, Werwolf was a failure, and with the acceptance of that
simple fact a thorough examination of the factors that led to this failure can be undertaken.

Part I: German Blunders
In Theory
Werwolf was, from the outset, formed around an SS organizational core. As such,
Himmler exercised ultimate authority over the organization. On September 19th, 1944, he
appointed a Generalinspekteur für Spezialabwehr (General Inspector for Special Abwehr) to
oversee all Werwolf activities.10 This man was SS-Obergruppenführer Hans-Adolf Prützmann, a
longtime member of the SS whose anti-partisan responsibilities as HSSPF (Höhere SS- und
Polizeiführer, or Higher SS and Police Leader) of Russia-North and then Latvia from June 1941June 1944 made him an ideal candidate for the task of coordinating Nazi guerrilla resistance.11
Once appointed, Prützmann organized a large staff, the “Bureau Prützmann”, through which the
Werwolf’s training, logistics, and operations would be coordinated. This group operated out of a
central headquarters at Rheinsburg, northwest of Berlin.12 Through this headquarters staff, the
first Werwolf units were organized and deployed by the beginning of November 1944, mainly for
the purposes of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering in areas already overrun by the Allies.
By January of 1945, supply caches of food and weapons had been established in the Reichswald,
Eifel, Saar, Palatinate, and Baden areas.13
Regionally the movement was organized based on the boundaries of the Reich’s twentyone Wehrkreise (home defense regions), and was controlled by the Higher SS and Police Leaders
10
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(HSSPF). This use of regional police inspectors in the Werwolf chain of command rather than
officers within the SS or Waffen-SS can be seen as a continuance of Himmler’s customary
practice of asserting his authority through the ever-present police force. The regional directors in
turn were to designate local commanders who, as “Werwolf Commissioners” would coordinate
the recruitment and use of Werwolf operatives.14
At the ground level, Werwolf units were to be organized into groups of four to six men.
Six to ten of these groups would make up a sector (or platoon), and six to eight platoons a
section. In theory, each basic group was to be equipped with small arms, Panzerfäuste, grenades,
and plastic explosives. Uniforms were to be issued, but fighters were allowed to don civilian
clothing should a specific mission call for it.15

Organizational Issues and the Waffen-SS
As stated above, Werwolf cells were under the control of the SS Police commissioners, to
ensure that Himmler would be able to maintain personal control over the organization. Serious
frustrations with regards to organization began at the regional level. Though the HSSPFs held
positions of relatively high authority within their respective regions, and had the backing of
subordinate groups like the local Gestapo and Criminal Police, they could not order adjacent
organizations (military or otherwise) to surrender recruits and supplies to the Werwolf cause.
They also had to contend with competition from the regional Gauleiter (governor), who
commanded the area’s Volkssturm units and fell under Party jurisdiction.16 In addition, the
involvement of so many different military and government agencies made coordination
extremely difficult. One interrogation report detailing Werwolf preparations and activity in the
14
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Munich Wehrkreis states that each of the following organizations or offices was to elect a
Werwolf “officer” for the region: the Hitler Youth, the HSSPF, the Gauleitung, the SA, and the
commanding general of the Wehrkreis, a Wehrmacht officer.17 The disruption of
communications networks throughout Germany made it even more difficult for these five offices
to coordinate with one another; direction of Werwolf units to areas where they were needed,
requesting supplies, and passing of important messages all became near-impossible tasks.18
Because it also drew its recruits from young, indoctrinated German youth, a nebulous Hitler
Youth partisan organization-the brainchild of Artur Axmann- also found itself under the control
of the Werwolf, requiring coordination with HJ leaders and further adding to the confusion.19
The inability of the HSSPFs to exercise any command authority over these various
organizations also meant that leaders were more or less free to do what they pleased with regards
to their personal Werwolf activities. Following a meeting of Gestapo officials in Bad Tölz,
Bavaria in late April 1945, for example, it was decided by their chief, an Obersturmbannführer
Glitz, that due to Werwolf’s disorganization and inaction in the region, the Gestapo would no
longer be associated with the movement. Rather, he stated, it was the Gestapo’s responsibility to
“keep alive the national idea…and to encourage [Germans] in keeping up the birth rate.”20
The exclusion of the Waffen-SS in the Werwolf chain of command caused friction
between its commanders and Werwolf leaders; as the Waffen-SS was the combat arm of the
organization, it would make more tactical sense to place the Werwolf under their authority.21 The
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embodiment of this friction was the relationship between Prützmann and SSObersturmbannführer Otto Skorzeny, leader of the newly-formed SS-Jagdverbände, or
“Ranger” units, which carried out special operations during the last year of the war. One
interrogation report describes their dealings with one another as “not openly hostile” but
“decidedly cool”.22 Animosity between Prützmann and Skorzeny began as early as November
1944, during a meeting of SS Police leaders at Himmler’s headquarters near Hohenlychen.
There, and in front of Prützmann, Himmler openly offered command of the fledgling Werwolf to
Skorzeny. Prützmann is said to have shifted uncomfortably in his seat and lowered his head as
Skorzeny respectfully replied that he already had enough military duties to keep him occupied.23
In reality, Skorzeny had other reasons for turning down the assignment; his memoirs reveal he
did not believe the organization could ever be successful, and that he did not think he should
have any part in it.24 Still, Himmler ordered that Skorzeny’s office provide assistance and advice
to Prützmann; it was agreed upon that SS-Jagdverbände schools would serve as training centers
for Werwolf recruits, and that Werwolf units would have access to up to twenty-five percent of
the sabotage equipment from Skorzeny’s own depots.25 This arrangement only furthered
Skorzeny’s dislike of Werwolf-he resented having to share personnel and supplies with a
fledgling sabotage organization not unlike his own “Ranger” units, who he felt were better suited
to the task of guerrilla operations. In addition, he knew his own resources were already stretched
thin attempting to equip and train Ranger members for future operations.26 Soon complaints

22
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began to pour into Skorzeny’s office from disgruntled “Ranger” units regarding the outrageous
demands of Werwolf organizers, demands which were promptly denied by Skorzeny himself.27
Prützmann’s Werwolf put in requests for plenty of sabotage-related equipment from other
sources as well; a firm in Reutlingen was ordered to provide 5,000 containers to be used for
Werwolf sabotage kits containing explosives and an anti-personnel mine, and 2,000 “light
portable receiver-transmitter sets” were requested from the Blaupunkt radio factory in Berlin.
None of the wireless sets made it to Werwolf groups, and manufacturers managed to deliver just
five hundred of the sabotage kits.28
Lack of supplies meant cells often had to survive on what they could scrounge from
Wehrmacht supply depots and captured Allied war material. One Werwolf member recalls
scavenging the Siegfried Line in southwestern Germany for explosives:
There were gaps and holes all over the place, and we could see exactly where the miens
had been planted. This was crazy, but we would carefully pull the mine out and take off
the lid. Then, holding the pin steady with two fingers, we would deactivate the bomb.
Next, we would remove the detonator to take with us. We took hundreds of them and
used them to blow up French military vehicles.29

Recruiting and Training
At a time when the Reich’s manpower resources were being stretched to their limit,
organizations like the SS and the Wehrmacht were extremely reluctant to surrender recruits and
instructors to a newly created guerrilla force when frontline units were already deprived of
essential personnel.30 In addition, on Skorzeny’s orders, the SS often withheld its best recruits for
membership in one of their own Jagdverbände, and the Gauleiter kept a number of suitable men

27
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for service in the Volkssturm. Werwolf units also required the use of Hitler Youth training camps
and Waffen-SS schools to train their recruits, having no facilities of their own. This often created
heated debates over which organization had ownership of a particular school’s “graduating
class”. One such example took place in the Wiesbaden area in the spring of 1945. Werwolf
officials claimed ownership of several classes of Hitler Youth trainees graduating from a local
sabotage school-trainees that would ordinarily have gone to the Waffen-SS. Before Wiesbaden’s
HSSPF, Jürgen Stroop, could authorize the transfer, however, SS-General Berger, his
commanding officer, radioed him directly, forbidding the use of any of “his boys” for Werwolf
activities.31 Cadre to train Werwolf recruits was also to be drawn from the Wehrmacht and SS
officer corps, further depriving those units of experienced leadership (it was the intent that
Werwolf instructors be veterans of anti-partisan fighting on the Eastern Front).32
Many times the issue was not finding recruits, but willing recruits. For most ordinary
Germans, Werwolf had little appeal. Nazi wartime propaganda regarding anti-partisan operations
in the Balkans, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe had conditioned them to view resistance
fighters as criminals and sub-humans, and gave the German population a subconscious disdain
for guerrilla fighting.33 In addition, partisan life offered few comforts to ordinary German
citizens who had already suffered so much. It was highly unlikely that the average citizen would
join a movement which stood against the end of the war which created these conditions in the
first place.
Some schools took questionable steps in order to fill their quotas, including putting
trainees through a Werwolf course of instruction and only once it was completed informing them

31

Biddiscombe, Werwolf!, 32.
Biddiscombe, Werwolf!, 34.
33
British Public Record Office, FO 898/187 (Records of the Foreign Office): “Summary of and comments on German
Propaganda Ministry broadcasts”.
32

Hurley 13

that they were a member of the organization. Gauleiters called for volunteers from the local
Party’s ranks, and often times when numbers were low they conveniently forgot to mention the
phrase Werwolf in their decrees, instead stating simply that dedicated volunteers were required
for “special duties”. In accordance with their powers as defense coordinators and head of the
Volkssturm for their respective regions, Gauleiters also had the ability to, when necessary, force
men into the Werwolf against their will. Even these desperate acts were not guaranteed to provide
the manpower needed: interrogation reports from captured German soldiers revealed instances of
Werewolves sent out on foot to their assigned locations and simply deserting, instead seizing the
opportunity to make their way home.34
Herbert Mittelstädt, an eighteen year-old drafted into the Wehrmacht in January of 1945
recalls how, on May 1st of that same year:
Our lieutenant approached the 25 of us, and gravely announced, ‘I no longer believe that
there is any way possible for us to win this war. I am going to discharge you, and
whoever wants to, can continue to fight with me as a Werewolf.’ Only one guy raised his
hand…Since the lieutenant only had a single ally, he said, ‘The whole thing is not worth
it. I’m going to discharge myself as well!’35
Melita Maschmann, head of the Department for Press and Propaganda for the Bund
Deutscher Mädel (BDM, the female counterpart to the Hitler Youth), was twenty-five years old
in the spring of 1945. A dedicated National Socialist, she joined forces with an SS “Ranger” Unit
hiding out in a remote mountain valley near Innsbruck for the last few weeks of the war, but
seemed unimpressed by the Werwolf; in her memoirs, Maschmann describes her willingness to
fight on during the “dark future” that lay ahead, but also recalls that “I was ordered to report to
Garmisch for ‘Werewolf’ training, but I paid no attention to this.”36
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Yet there were inevitably some who took their duties seriously, and continued to resist.
Klaus Messmer was a sixteen year-old member of a Werwolf detachment based in southwestern
Germany, and recalls:
For us ‘Werewolves’ it was only natural that we resist in any way we could, and we
really did some pretty dumb things. We snuck out and made our way to the [French]
vehicles. We smashed dashboards to pieces, and poured sand by the handfuls into the gas
tanks. After a while we decided to change our tactics and began to blow them up…Our
church youth group had a small cabin in the mountains. We used it as our main
headquarters and as a place to store our weapons, hand grenades, carbines, and all of the
explosives we had removed from along the Rhine. And it was there we planned all of our
attacks.
Even Messmer’s group, however, eventually realized “that our efforts to resist had done
absolutely nothing to change anything. A new era had begun and there was nothing we could do
about it.”37

Poor Leadership
Substandard leadership began at the highest echelons of Werwolf command. Prützmann
had established a reputation for being “vain and idle” during his time on Himmler’s staff, long
before Werwolf’s formation, so much so that it was the opinion of several high-ranking SSGenerals that he should be stripped of command entirely.38 The ever-worsening war situation and
the multitude of problems that plagued Werwolf throughout its existence only exacerbated
Prützmann’s behavior. Far from a shining example of the spirit of resistance and the will to fight
on, Prützmann was no different than many other top Nazis during the end of the war; by April
1945 he saw the writing on the wall, and amid nights of drunken desperation he, like his superior
Himmler, began to contemplate ways of negotiating a truce with the Western Allies via the

37
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Danish Resistance. In May 1945, after issuing a brief message to his Werewolves urging them to
avoid “unnecessary losses”, Prützmann fled north to join the new Dönitz government, and eager
to find a way out of Germany before it was too late for him.39
The unwillingness to participate in Werwolf activities existed not only at the ground level,
but also amongst higher echelons of leadership. SS-Sturmbannfürher and Munich
Kriminalpolizei officer Ernst Wagner was informed of his new duties as Werwolf commissioner
for the Munich area in mid-April 1945 by his superior, SS-Obergruppenführer Freiherr Friedrich
Karl von Eberstein. Von Eberstein admitted privately to Wagner that he had no faith in the idea
of Werwolf, and that he only appointed him because he could no longer ignore the order calling
for a Werwolf organization in Munich without risking a reprisal from higher levels of command.
As such, and given that Wagner also had to manage an entire division of the Munich
Kriminalpolizei during this time, few preparations were made for Werwolf activities in the
Munich area.40

Werwolf and the Nazi Party
The propaganda activities of senior Nazi Party officials Martin Bormann and Joseph
Goebbels in the spring of 1945 further confused the Werwolf situation. As the war situation grew
ever worse, Werwolf resistance became of the utmost interest to the Party, with Goebbels in
particular seizing upon the idea. He first mentions Werwolf in his diary on March 26th, 1945,
announcing that “I am now busy organizing the so-called ‘Werwolf’ movement on a large scale.
The purpose of Werwolf is to organize partisan groups in enemy-occupied territories. Not much
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preparation has been made so far.”41 Given that Prützmann had formed Werwolf the previous
autumn, and the organization had just the day before carried out a successful assassination of
Aachen mayor Franz Oppenhoff, this entry smacks of arrogance, and illustrates the lack of trust
Goebbels placed in Prützmann and the SS-led organization in general.
That Goebbels had little respect for Prützmann is evident in a diary entry dated March
28th, 1945. He stated outright that “I am not satisfied with the work of our Werwolf
organization…At my next interview with the Führer I may well try to annex this organization
myself. I would impart more drive to it than it has at present”.42 How Goebbels and other Party
officials would exercise control over anything other than the group’s propaganda is unclear,
given that military control of Werwolf rested ultimately with Himmler. Still, attempts were made,
most notably a letter written by Party Minister Martin Bormann to all Gauleitung ordering them
to appoint Werwolf officers, and, even more ridiculous, a directive issued by Bormann during the
last days of the battle for Berlin, which stated “All Werwolf activity is to be suspended…the
Werwolf is dissolved!”.43
What Goebbels lacked in direct action, he attempted to make up for with an excessive
propaganda campaign championing the idea of Werwolf resistance. His original plans called for
both a Werwolf radio station and a newspaper, though the radio station was the only venture to
get off the ground before war’s end. With its first broadcast on April 1st, 1945, Werwolf Radio’s
mission was twofold: report the activities (real or fabricated) of Werwolf groups throughout
Germany, and issue threats and warnings to would-be German collaborators and Allied
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sympathizers.44 The propaganda aspect of this “news outlet” cannot be understated; much of
what was reported was fabricated or grossly over exaggerated to benefit the Nazi cause. The
killing of U.S. General Maurice Rose, for example, was attributed to Werwolf fighters, when in
fact the general was killed near Paderborn after stumbling upon a German tank patrol.45
Biddiscombe notes that “Goebbels himself was the first to admit, at least privately, that Werwolf
Radio’s output was not actually the news, but ‘the news as it should be.’”46
These exaggerations naturally produced friction between the Propaganda Ministry and
the Bureau Prützmann, which lamented that Werwolf Radio had no way of proving that the few
real instances of guerrilla activity they reported were the work of actual Werewolves, and that
the propaganda campaign as a whole cast the Werwolf in a bad light and embarrassed the
organization.47 In a conversation with Hamburg Gauleiter Karl Kaufmann, Prützmann freely
admitted, “that he too considered the activity of the Wehrwolf station to be wrong, dangerous,
and stupid, and, that because of this, there were grave dissentions between himself and the
Propaganda Ministry.”48

Rejection by the Dönitz Government and Cancellation
The fact that at present an armistice reigns means that I must ask every German man and woman
to stop any illegal activity in the Werewolf or other such organizations in those territories
occupied by the Western Allies because this can only injure our people.49
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-May 5th, 1945 radio address by Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz
By May 1st, with Hitler dead and the end rapidly approaching, Prützmann followed
Himmler north to meet with newly-appointed Reichspräsident Grand Admiral Karl Dönitz in
Flensburg, who brusquely ignored both men. Dönitz, eager to disassociate himself and his new
government with any and all radical Nazi figures, had no use for Himmler on his staff, and
dismissed him. The new regime, freed from the constraints of Hitler’s fanatical “victory or
death” mentality, sought out representatives from the Western Allies in order to establish peace
before the Soviets arrived. On May 5th, a regional cease-fire was declared in northwest Europe,
and thus the new regime sought to terminate any instances of military activity that might violate
the agreement and potentially jeopardize their chance to escape a Soviet occupation. As a result,
all Werwolf activities on the Western front were cancelled via a radio broadcast made that same
night.50 Both Himmler and Prützmann ended up suffering similar fates; captured by the British,
they committed suicide by means of poison, with Prützmann ending his life in a detention camp
on May 21st, 1945.51
Given these numerous issues and setbacks, as well as a daily worsening of the situations
on both fronts that often prevented the formation and training of new Werwolf units, it is not
surprising that very few SS-Werwolf operations were actually carried out. Perhaps the most wellknown and successful of these was the assassination of American-appointed Aachen Mayor
Franz Oppenhoff in late March 1945.52 On March 20th, 1945, under cover of darkness, a joint
SS-Werwolf hit team comprised of a sixteen-year old Hitler Youth, a BDM girl, an SS “Ranger”
officer and NCO, and two scouts with knowledge of the Aachen area parachuted into a nearby
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forest and then made their way into the city, confronting Oppenhoff at his doorstep on the
evening of March 25th and shooting him in the head.53
Further operations undertaken in the name of Werwolf resistance were carried out on the
orders of local commanders acting independently of any established chain of command. Indeed,
by the time of the Oppenhoff assassination, the chaotic state of communications networks inside
Germany made it nearly impossible for Prützmann to maintain contact with or relay orders to the
HSSPFs and other Werwolf commissioners. As command and control at the top faltered, local
commanders on the ground were forced to act on their own initiative, and the resulting power
vacuum left by an absence of leadership (or too much of it; often the squabbling between local
Army, SS, Police, and other leadership proved worse than having no one in charge) produced
results that varied with each region, area, and Werwolf commander (self-proclaimed or
otherwise).54 Some, when they could safely do so, chose to simply disband their partisan groups
in the face of vastly superior Allied forces. Karl Kaufmann, Gauleiter of Hamburg, was careful
“to keep the Hamburg Wehrwolf Organisation under my control in all circumstances”, so as not
to jeopardize his surrender of northwest Germany to the Allies.55 Others, indoctrinated by years
as functionaries of the Nazi party, dutifully carried out whatever final orders they had been
given, which for most entailed no surrender and fighting on until resources and manpower were
exhausted, no matter the cost. There were other Nazis who chose fanatical resistance as well,
bound not by a sense of duty but an overpowering realization that the end was coming, that they
had nowhere to run, and that, based on their thorough indoctrination in Nazi values and ideology,
it was better to die in this final battle than live to see a world without Hitler and Nazism.
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Part II: The American Impact
Werwolf Postwar
The issues described above by and large prevented the survival of any major Werwolf
movement into the postwar era. It was inevitable, however, that given the sheer number of
Werwolf cells in varying states of readiness throughout Germany, the multitude of tasks facing
American forces in the first few weeks of the occupation, and the fact that many cells had
already been operating independent of any central command structure for the last several weeks
of the war, a number of Werwolf groups were able to “slip through the cracks” and remain
undetected by Allied authorities in the first hectic weeks and months of the occupation. SSObergruppenführer Jürgen Stroop, HSSPF for Wehrkreis XII (Wiesbaden) and Werwolf
organizer in that region, recalled during his interrogation an April 30th meeting with one SSSturmbannführer Dietze in the Bavarian town of Bad Tölz. Dietze remarked to Stroop that “the
war was not lost so far as he was concerned”, and that “he was going to lead 240-250 men to
prepared positions in the Karwendel-Gebirge to await better times.”56 Werwolf units composed
of Hitler Youth members and cadre took up residence in the Bad Tölz area beginning in May of
1945 and, assisted by SS-Feldwebel Max Reutemann and a forest ranger named Höfner, they
remained there until July. When their presence attracted the attention of nearby US forces, the
guerrillas abandoned their mountain huts and scattered throughout the region.57 Captured
minutes from a meeting of Werwolf leaders in early May 1945 instructed operatives to pose as
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anti-Nazis, thereby gaining the trust of American occupation authorities and buying time until
conditions for guerrilla activity improved.58
While the reality of occupation proved far less frightening than the picture painted by
Nazi propaganda (and, as a result, Allied intelligence reports), there were nevertheless instances
of postwar guerrilla activity. Of particular importance are those acts which occurred well after
the cessation of hostilities, when the confusion and disorganization brought about by the collapse
of Nazism and the surrender of hundreds of thousands of German soldiers had long since
dissipated. These acts were not committed in the hectic final days of the war, or in its immediate
aftermath when some German military units were still being brought under control, but weeks
and months after the May 8th surrender, when peace had definitively set in, and the German
armed forces had completely ceased all operations.
The majority of Werwolf activity postwar was almost completely confined to southern
Germany, in the American and Soviet zones of occupation. This was due in part to the region’s
rugged, mountainous terrain, well-suited for guerrilla operations, as well as the influx of military
units south in the last few months of the war on the orders of the German High Command. Those
diehards who were unaffected by the announcement of Hitler’s death on May 1st, the Dönitz
cancellation of guerrilla warfare on May 5th, and the unconditional surrender on May 8th
resolved to continue their partisan activities for as long as possible. Their zealous devotion to
Nazism and fanatical resistance against the occupiers did little to help their cause, however. Still,
there were recorded instances of Werwolf activity, carried out by the most devoted Nazis:

58

Office of the Army Chief of Staff, G-2. “Minutes of the Secret Discussion of the Wehrwolf”, in IRR File XE 049 888
“Werewolf Activities Vol. I” RG 319, NA.

Hurley 22

-On June 12th, 1945, an American Soldier from the Fourth Armored Division was
reported missing. His body washed up on the shores of the Danube five days later, with a
wire wrapped around his neck.59
-On July 21st, 1945, a bridge near the Austro-German frontier town of Unken was
partially damaged by guerrilla explosives.60
-An intelligence report dated July 1945 warns of a Werwolf radio station still operating
somewhere in the vicinity of Arlberg and Innsbruck, Austria.
-In January 1946, a Werwolf cell operating near Passau beat to death three U.S. Military
Government officers investigating nearby black market operations and set their bodies on
fire. 61
These are several specific examples of a broader campaign of minor sabotage activities,
which, according to both Biddiscombe and Fritz, included sniping, wire cutting, and the
placement of decapitation wires and mines on frequently traveled roads. Such activities
represented isolated incidents, however, and not the norm when it came to postwar Germany,
due to the aggressive nature of the Allied occupation.
Planning the Occupation
Occupation began swiftly and harshly in the American Zone, the result of months of
planning and preparation by US policy makers and military commanders. Those given the task of
preparing the American occupation policy for Germany did so with a keen eye for stamping out
potential guerrilla activity. Werwolf had been on the minds of Allied intelligence agencies since
the end of 1944. A document dated November 14th of that year from the G-3 division of SHAEF
titled “Study of French Guerrilla and Resistance Tactics, and German Counter Measures”
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describes in detail common sabotage operations undertaken by the French Maquis and other
resistance groups in occupied Europe, so as to offer examples of what Allied forces might face in
Germany from Werwolf groups.62
The early months of 1945 brought American forces even closer to a victory in Europe,
and the emphasis on preparing for and preventing guerrilla warfare increased. A memo dated
April 9th, 1945 from U.S. Twelfth Army Group Headquarters to SHAEF’s G-2 Division makes it
clear the necessity to stamp out traces of guerrilla activity:
[Werwolf] Organization numbers several hundred, possibly 1,000. Schools identified at
Isserlohn and Lubeck, Westphalia, run by SS. Instruction, lasting a week, includes
weapons, sabotage, and guerrilla warfare…to avoid terrorization of population in early
stages, imperative you take energetic measures to identify and penetrate Werwolf and
similar subversive organizations.63
Maps detailing the locations of underground caves suspected of containing arms caches
or Werwolf hideouts were distributed to members of the American Twelfth, Twenty-First, and
Sixth Army Groups in mid-April 1945.64 Plans were even put in place to interrogate German
“forest wardens”, the equivalent of a park ranger, especially those appointed from September
1944 onward, due to the possibility that they could be working with the Werwolf to keep watch
over hidden stocks of weapons and other equipment.65
A crucial aspect of these preparations for guerrilla warfare was the informing of
American troops; the average GI needed to know what to expect when he entered Germany. This
was accomplished through the issuing of numerous informational pamphlets to troops about to
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enter Germany, or report for occupation duty. One such piece, entitled Pocket Guide to
Germany, stated very clearly, in a section titled “Keep Your Distance”:
You are in enemy country! These people are not our allies or our friends…You are in
unfriendly territory…You cannot afford to relax caution now.66
It goes on to describe how the remnants of 500,000 elite “SS Guards” would most likely blend
into the general population, and begin underground activities, and then once more urges
vigilance.67 Pocket Guide was required reading for all occupation troops, and by order of General
Eisenhower each man was to carry it in his helmet liner at all times.68
Another pamphlet, Don’t Be A Sucker in Germany, emphasized the dangers of
fraternization with the Germans, particularly women, stating “German women have been trained
to seduce you. Is it worth a knife in the back?”69 It went on to make a similar point about
German youth, saying that many had been trained in sabotage and espionage activities, and not
to trust them.70 A handout specifically tailored towards guerrilla fighting, Combatting the
Guerilla, offered an extensive history of the guerrilla movements faced by the Germans in their
own occupied territories, counter measures that could be taken in the event of an ambush, raid, or
attack on a railroad network or supply line, and a description of the Werwolf. It began with the
statement that “German attempts at underground or guerrilla activity may increase as our forces
complete the occupation of Germany.”71
That these pamphlets were distributed to the lowest echelons of fighting men, the men
who would actually be conducting the occupation, is testament to the fact that Nazi guerrilla
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resistance, of which Werwolf was the embodiment, was a topic of great interest and concern to
Allied strategists and planners, and to them a very real possibility, so much so that they felt it
necessary to ensure every GI entering Germany knew what to expect.

The Occupation Begins
At the end of hostilities on May 8th, combat troops deployed in Germany had overnight
become occupation units. The aim was to establish an American military presence everywhere,
and take the necessary steps to pacify the population and prevent resistance: roving patrols,
bridge and road checkpoints, and stationary guards on all U.S. property and equipment.72 All
telephone and postal services were deemed off-limits to Germans, and a strict curfew was
established. Citizens were allowed to travel by foot or bicycle only.73 A proclamation was issued
ordering all Germans to turn in all firearms, ammunition, explosives, knives, bayonets, and other
“contraband” to Military Government Authorities by midnight on July 20th, 1945.74 In addition,
all German courts were shut down and replaced with Military Government tribunals, and Allied
currency became legal tender.75 Subversive activity was, for the most part, ruthlessly stamped
out or prevented through a series of sweeps and raids conducted by units of the US Army
Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), combat support troops, and later the U.S. Constabulary
throughout 1945-46.
No time was wasted in tracking down former Nazi leaders now on the run inside
occupied Germany. This group of high-profile Nazis included many members of the Werwolf
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organization, and most who survived the war’s end found themselves under arrest within just a
few weeks after the surrender. Prützmann, as described above, was captured by the British and
committed suicide in late May of 1945, as did his immediate superior Himmler. Martin Bormann
and Joseph Goebbels died alongside Hitler in Berlin. Although many of the “big fish” of
Werwolf did not survive to be tried or imprisoned, many of the smaller-level functionaries were
netted during the summer of 1945, thus depriving surviving Werwolf cells of any significant
command and control structure. Some of the first to be arrested, the interrogation reports for the
following individuals gave the US some of its first credible intelligence regarding Werwolf, as
well as lists of other Germans suspected or known to the prisoners as being involved in
subversive activities:
-SS-Obergruppenführer Freiherr Friedrich Karl von Eberstein- arrested in May of 1945.
HSSPF of Wehrkreis VII (Munich) and (unwillingly) designated Werwolf Commissioner
for all of southern Germany.
-SS-Sturmbannfürher Ernst Wagner- an officer of the Munich Kriminalpolizei, and
subordinate to von Eberstein. Appointed Werwolf director for the Munich area in midApril 1945. Arrested by the CIC on May 8th, 1945.
-SS-Obergruppenführer Jürgen Stroop-HSSPF for Wehrkreis XII (Wiesbaden) and thus
organizer of the Werwolf there. Arrested in early May 1945 in Bavaria.76
In addition to arresting high-profile Nazis, US forces also attempted to discover and
destroy Werwolf hideouts throughout the occupied zone. A SHAEF Intelligence Report dated
May 19th 1945 details a raid made by CIC units on a Werwolf Headquarters in Bavaria, resulting
in the capture of six officers and twenty-five operatives, as well as a civilian car, a Wehrmacht
76

Intermediate Interrogation Report No. 24: “O/Gruf Stroop, Juergen, HSSPf Wkr XII“; Intermediate Interrogation
Report No. 18: “Krim Rat Stubaf Wagner, Ernst“; Intermediate Interrogation Report No. 5: “O/Gruf and Gen d Pol
Freiherr Friedrich Karl von Eberstein“, all in IRR File XE 049 888, “Werewolf Activities Vol. I“ RG 319, NA.

Hurley 27

motorcycle, a large stock of automatic weapons, and stores of food meant to last for months.77
That same month, a CIC detachment with the U.S. Twelfth Armored Division uncovered a
Werwolf cell and supply cache near Heidenheim that included arms and ammunition, and that
June another CIC unit discovered an even larger stash of machine guns, Panzerfäuste, small
arms, and motorcycles nearby.78
One large-scale security action undertaken soon after the war’s end was Operation
Tallyho, a CIC-led operation devised by Brigadier General Edwin L. Sibert, Assistant Chief of
Staff, Intelligence Section, US Forces European Theater. Its objective was to seize illegally
possessed weapons and root out any subversive activity already forming in the American
Occupied Zone.79 At 4:30am on July 21st, 1945, CIC units all over the American Zone conducted
raids of their respective sectors, capturing 2,747 illegal small arms and thousands of items
belonging to the former German armed forces.80
The importance of the raid in stamping out early indications of Werwolf activity cannot
be understated. Even in small hamlets located in relatively “quiet” sectors of the American Zone,
startling discoveries were made. Ib Melchior, a member of CIC Detachment 212 in Kötzting,
Bavaria, remembers the early-morning raid well:
In our operation alone we brought in quite a haul…one refugee hiding in a house, under
interrogation turned out to be the former Nazi Police Chief of Prague…we found a
Wehrmacht –issue BMWR-750 motorcycle hidden in a pile of hay in a barn. We
unearthed military radio transmitters, binoculars…and enough dynamite to blow up the
building in which we had our offices. In the chimney in one house we found three Army
rifles, carefully oiled and protected in smoke-proof bags; the raid took place weeks after
the war was over and the shooting had stopped, obviously some of the Germans had other
ideas.81

77

“Werewolf (Miscellaneous Information)” in IRR File XE 049 888 “Werewolf Activities Vol. I” RG 319, NA
Fritz, Endkampf, 205.
79
Biddiscombe, Werwolf!, 82.
80
Ziemke, The US Army, 318-19.
81
Melchior, Melchior a la Carte.
78

Hurley 28

The end of the winter of 1945-46 brought on a renewed offensive against subversive
activity in the American Zone. A sweep of the Bavarian Alpine region by US forces in April
1946 netted nine Werwolf operatives, as well as a “hit list” of prominent individuals to be wiped
out by the group.82 But the largest and most successful undertaking by occupation forces that
spring was Operation Nursery. The result of months of investigation by CIC agents and other
occupation forces, Nursery broke the back of an underground network consisting of former
Hitler Youth leaders, led by none other than Reich Youth Minister Artur Axmann himself.
Axmann, who had escaped the siege of Berlin and fled south in May of 1945, worked actively in
the last few weeks of the war to funnel as many Reich Youth leaders and members south to
Bavaria, with the intent of establishing a base for postwar guerrilla activity. Those members of
the Hitler Youth and BDM who were able to reach southern Germany underwent several weeks
of sabotage training at hastily-formed schools in the Tutzingerhütte and Benediktbeuren areas,
run by SS non-commissioned officers. At war’s end these schools were abandoned and the
recruits scattered throughout the region, presumably to await further orders.83 Axmann,
meanwhile, coordinated the establishment of a “front company” of sorts for the HJ-Werwolf; his
economic advisor, Willi Heidemann, purchased a transportation firm based in Bad Tölz, Bavaria,
and the profits generated by it postwar helped to fund the resistance movement. CIC agents
managed to infiltrate Heidemann’s enterprise as early as the summer of 1945, however, and
obtain lists of over 1,000 suspected participants in the HJ-Werwolf.84 With this information in
hand, CIC units launched “Nursery” in early 1946. Axmann himself was arrested at a roadblock
in December of 1945, while traveling around southern Germany to coordinate activities amongst
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the various Werwolf cells in the area. Heidemann was arrested on January 7th, 1945, and Nursery
raids in March of 1946 netted a further 800 Werewolves, some surrendering only after gunfights
with American forces.85 The result of the entire operation was the arrest of virtually the entire
remaining HJ leadership by April of 1946, and the end of any HJ-inspired Werwolf activity in
southern Germany.86
The U.S. Constabulary
The establishment of the U.S. Constabulary in February 1946 brought more support to
the American counter-insurgency campaign. Envisioned as a small mobile police and security
force specifically trained for occupation duty, U.S. Constabulary Headquarters was established
on February 15th, 1946, in the Bavarian town of Bamberg.87 This hand-picked and well trained
force, which gradually replaced the combat troops currently occupying the American Zone,
focused its efforts on roving security patrols, the maintenance of law and order amongst the
German population, and the conducting of search and seizure operations to secure surviving Nazi
propaganda, weapons, and high value targets. CIC units continued to prevent the formation of
resistance movements and other subversive elements, while the constabulary handled physical
security.
Given the extent of this anti-Werwolf campaign, it is little surprise that The New York
Times published an article on October 27th, 1946, proclaiming “German Resistance Threat Has
Failed to Materialize.” The article notes the success of Operation Nursery, and the lack of

85

Sydney Gruson, “Night Raids Staged: Arrests Follow 10-Month Investigation in U.S. and British Zones.” New York
Times, March 31, 1946.
86
“200 Towns Raided in Hunt for Nazis.” New York Times, April 1, 1946.
87

Oliver J. Fredericksen, The American Military Occupation of Germany, 1945-1953(Historical Division,
Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, 1953), 66.

Hurley 30

evidence regarding rumors of “SS men hiding out in the mountains”.88 Following the extensive
raids of the previous spring, subversive activity had all but disappeared; a 1947 study showed
that from July 1946-June 1947, only five U.S. personnel were “murdered” in the American Zone.
The other causes of death were “suicide”, “manslaughter”, “accidental”, and “traffic”. In
addition, no explanation was given as to the details of the five murders, and no subversive
activity was mentioned.89

Conclusions
Biddiscombe, considered by many the expert on Werwolf, attempts in his book to explain
its failure while still maintaining the idea that the movement was in some ways successful,
offering postwar incidents of sabotage as proof of this. This paper, while certainly embracing
aspects of all Werwolf historiography written thus far, rejects the idea of Werwolf success. In
order to fully explain the movement’s failure, it must be maintained that it was in fact, from start
to finish, a failure. It failed to gain popularity amongst the military, it failed to bring about any
major policy changes in Allied strategy, and most notably it failed to prolong the war for any
significant period of time. German inefficiency and bureaucratization doomed any chances the
movement had at establishing itself so as to direct behind-the-lines activity, and those isolated
cells that did manage to mobilize in time and survive the end of the war stood little chance
against American occupation forces. The threat of Nazi guerrilla activity was a factor taken into
consideration during the formation of American postwar occupation policy. American forces
entered Germany with the intent of establishing a firm hold over the German population and
88
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preventing Werwolf guerrillas from operating in a postwar environment. They wasted no time in
arresting former Werwolf leaders, infiltrating resistance movements, and confiscating weapons
and other subversive material.
Isolated incidents of sabotage or resistance, while certainly significant to those who
experienced them, cannot be taken as anything more than the final gasps of radicalism and terror
of a regime in its death throes. Indeed, successful sabotage activities occurred not because of
Werwolf¸ but in spite of it.
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